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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to empirically examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
intellectual capital performance of Ethiopian commercial banks using short panel data. The study crafted 
explanatory research design with a combination of secondary source of data collection, ex post control over 
variables, unbalanced panel with cross sectional and time dimension inclined with quantitative research approach. 
Besides, both financial and non-financial data of 14 commercial banks were used. Econometric model estimation 
procedures and diagnostic tests for classical linear regression model assumptions were also carried out. In fact, 
random effects regression model was selected as best fitted model over pooled OLS and fixed effect. Both 
descriptive statistics and regression analysis were also conducted.  As a result, empirical findings of the random 
effects GLS regression analysis indicated that gender diversity and profitability have statistically significant and 
positive effect on intellectual capital performance of commercial banks. On the other hand, board size has 
statistically significant and negative effect on intellectual capital performance. However, board remuneration and 
bank size failed to show statistically significant effect. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Intellectual Capital, Random effects, Banks 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
To date, the development of economy and wealth creation depends more on the production, diffusion and use of 
intellectual capital, shifting from industrial economy to knowledge based economy. For that reason, the worth of 
individuals, organizations, regions and countries is mostly the effect of their intellectual capital (Chao, Xiao, & 
Lingyu, 2015). The higher the performance of intellectual capital of a firm, the more the competitive and winner 
the sector will be, and the better in boosting economic growth (Meressa, 2016).Thus, intellectual capital is the 
main foundation for success of company which can be considered as a life blood of knowledge intensive economy  
(Fahim, Maleki, & Yousefnezhad, 2013). In fact, the need to develop and manage this asset has become a serious 
obligation in the national level and in any business arena (Iranmahd, Moeinaddin, Shahmoradi, & Heyrani, 
2014).In the same fashion, corporate governance has become one of the most important topics for business 
environment and governments in a globalized economy. Its proper implementation brings out advantages for 
companies and countries. That’s why it has become one of the most important researchable issues recently (Yuksel, 
2008).However, the relationship between corporate governance practices and company financial performance has 
been a matter of considerable interest to academic researchers and the general public even though intellectual 
capital performance is the most important resource to take competitive advantage in the recent economic 
phenomenon (Swartz & Firer, 2009). But, few studies were carried out on the relationship between corporate 
governance and intellectual capital performance (Swartz & Firer, 2009; Abidin, Kamal, & Jusoff, 2009; Al-Musalli 
& Ismail, 2012 ; Isa & Ismail, 2015) with mixed empirical results on corporate governace attributes’ impact on 
value added intellectual capital coefficient. As every nation has its unique economy, corporate governance is not 
homogenized rather varies from country to country (Mugunthan, 2013). Hence, its practices vary across nations 
and individual companies (Saheed, 2013). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no study has not yet 
examined on the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on intellectual capital performance of commercial 
banks in Ethiopia. Accordingly, this study tried to fill this gap by investingating the effect of these attributes on 
intellectual capital performance. 
The rest of the paper presents review of related literature in section 2 , data and research methodology in 
section 3, empirical results and discussions in section 4, and conclusion in the final section. 
 
2. Review of Related Literature  
Knowledge is superior to other productive elements. Accordingly, the current economy considers it as the most 
important productive element and names it the most important competitive factor (Momeni & Esmaeili, 2015). 
Intellectual capital is key success factor in the knowledge economy. It was first used by John Kenz Galbris in 1969. 
And he believed that intellectual capital is a means to achieve goals (Momeni & Esmaeili, 2015). In the current 
economy the predominant activity is no longer production of goods but production of this resource. Besides, it is 
the starting point of any further economic analysis. During the industrial era, the dominant way of value creation 
was production of goods. And lack of financial and physical capital has been considered as the main cause of 
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backwardness in developing countries (Rezai &Mousavi, 2015). However, the situation is different to date as long 
as intellectual capital is the main factor of success and development (Pulic, 2008). In the past two decades, the 
economic performance for most of countries in the world is driven by the development and invention of technology 
and these inventions are results of intellectual capital (Tsai, Yu, & Wen, 2013).Corporate governance is also a 
recent issue  used to maintain safety and soundness of financial system.  It is a system by which firms are controlled 
and directed to accomplish their objectives (Basyith, 2016).In addition, it involves a network of relationships 
between corporate managers, directors, and stakeholders (Saheed, 2013). It also fosters economic growth, increase 
investment financing, reduces costs of capital, manage stakeholders interest, and ultimately increase corporate 
performance (Pardis, Sofian, & Abdullah, 2016).The importance of corporate governance is distinguishing feature 
of new economy. Its attributes are becoming fundamental determinants of firm value and growth since economies 
are becoming knowledge and technology based. For that reason, the increasing interest in corporate governance is 
one of major developments within today’s business practice (Manini & Abdillahi, 2015). Likewise, it is associated 
with intellectual capital. Firms that comply with corporate governance guidelines should report their intellectual 
capital properly. This plays important role in achieving objectives of firms and assures their survival. Intellectual 
capital is important resource to outshine in competitive business. In the same vein, firms having higher compliance 
of corporate governance attract more investors as long as corporate governance is viewed as one asset .of firms 
(Basyith, 2016). Empirical evidences on the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on intellectual capital 
performance were discussed here to be used as a base for further analysis in this study. As a result, board size, 
board remuneration and gender diversity were used as explanatory variables among corporate governance 
attributes. 
Board of directors have greater contribution in the creation, development and management of intellectual 
capital of firms by configuring relevant policies and strategies that can ultimately improve value added intellectual 
capital coefficient. The larger the board size, the higher improvement in quality of strategic decisions and actions 
will be as stated in resource dependency theory. Besides, larger board size can bring better interlocking with 
stakeholders, in turn increases relational capital which is one element of intellectual capital (Al-Musalli & Ismail, 
2012). Larger boards allow firms to bring critical and diverse resources and experiences that can make the board’s 
decision effective and boost economic performance of companies (Oba, Ibikunle, & Damagum, 2013). There is a 
significant positive impact of company’s corporate governance measures like board size determination on 
intellectual capital performance (Makki & Lodhi, 2014). With respect to board size, the capacity of the board for 
monitoring proliferates as its number increases as far as larger board brings more human capital (Ayele, 2013). A 
study was carried out by Abidin, Kamal, & Jusoff (2009) on board structure and intellectual capital performance 
in Malaysia. It was carried out by using sample of 75 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia selected randomly. 
Results of the regression analysis revealed statistically significant and positive relationship between total number 
of directors and value added intellectual capital coefficient, implying that the larger the board size, the greater 
contribution towards value creation due to the assumption that more ideas and skills can be shared among board 
members. To the reverse of this, Al-Musalli & Ismail (2012) found significant and negative relationship between 
board size and level of intellectual capital performance in GCC banks. This may be due to problems of 
communication and coordination among the members of board to use their intellectual capacity while making 
strategic decisions of firms. Alizadeh, Chashmi, & Bahnamiri (2014) also examined the association between 
corporate governance and intellectual capital in the pharmaceutical companies accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange 
over the period 2004-2009 using a regression based model. Further, empirical evidences of this study found 
negative impact of board size on value added intellectual capital coefficient. The other attribute is remuneration of 
board. With regard to this, executive management could act opportunistically or speculatively to accumulate their 
personal income after using their privileged position at the cost of other stakeholders as explained in the proponents 
of agency theory (Isa & Ismail, 2015). A research study was made by Isa & Ismail (2015) titled the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on intellectual capital performance of Nigerian Banks using audited financial 
statements of sample banks for the period of 11 year  starting from 2003 to 2013. Regression result of this study 
discovered statistically significant and positive effect of board remuneration on value added intellectual capital 
coefficient used as a proxy of intellectual capital performance. Hence, board remuneration was best predictor of 
intellectual capital performance in this study.  
Gender diversity is also part of the broader concept of board diversity which is one of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Greater female representation on boards provides some additional skills and perspectives 
that could not be possible with all-male board members. Female board members could bring diverse viewpoints. 
In fact, gender diversity in boards is supported by different theoretical perspectives. For instance, agency theory 
highlighted that representation of directors from diverse groups may perhaps provide a balanced board. So, no one 
can dominate decision making of the board. It possibly will also provide representation for different stakeholders 
of the firm for fairness and equity according to the stakeholders' theory point of view (Manini & Abdillahi, 
2015).This issue is recently creating interest with majority of studies showing the positive effect of gender diversity 
on corporate boards  intellectual capital creation (Oba, Ibikunle, & Damagum, 2013). For that reason, variety of 
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arguments has tried to explain how companies could benefit from the presence of women on their board of directors. 
Empirically, a study was made by Swartz & Firer (2009) to examine the relationship between board structure and 
the intellectual capital performance of South African publicly listed companies using cross sectional multiple 
regressions. In view of that, empirical results of the study discovered statistically significant and positive 
relationship between percentage of women on the boards of directors and intellectual capital performance. 
Evidence of the research suggested that boards of directors with higher percentage of women could make decisions 
on the future intellectual capital performance with more sensitivity towards public concerns. Besides, women have 
more detailed thoughts involved in decision-making analysis (Rasmini, Wirakusuma, & Yuniasih, 2014). Business 
organizations recently have employees with diversity in terms of age, ethnic background, gender, educational 
qualification and others. However, compared to the diversity of other attributes, gender diversity appears to be the 
most extensively addressed issue in literature (Darmadi, 2010). In addition to the above corporate governance 
attributes, profitability and bank size were also used in this as control variables. Profitability is the ability of 
business to earn income. If banks generate profit, bank managers and research and development department, if 
any, could have time to do different intellectual activities that can improve competitiveness of a particular bank as 
well as banking sector in general (Sefidgar, Maleki, & Minouei, 2015). Empirical results of research studies 
indicate positive and statistically significant impact of return on asset as a proxy measure of bank profitability on 
intellectual capital performance of banks, suggesting banks with higher financial performance have better value 
added intellectual capital coefficient (El-Bannany, 2008; Eftekhare, Asgaryan, & Seyyedy, 2014). Bank size is 
also considered as another factor that affects value added intellectual capital coefficient. Empirical evidence of a 
research study carried out by Al-Musalli & Ismail (2012) failed to show statistically significant association 
between bank size and intellectual capital performance. On the other hand, El-Bannany (2012) found significant 
impact of bank size on value added intellectual capital coefficient. 
 
3.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section answers the question how the research was carried out. Particularly, it includes research design, data 
type, data source and method of collection, population, sample size and sampling technique, variables and their 
measurement, hypotheses formulation, econometric model specification and diagnostic tests, and data analysis. 
 
3.1. Research Design, Sample and Data Collection 
Researchers should choose among different types of possible research designs depending on such dimensions as 
purpose of the research, method of data collection, control of variables, time dimension, research approach, and 
other related issues as an architect chooses among different types of possible building designs depending on factors 
like purpose of the building, method of construction, time of construction and other relevant factors (Gebru, 
2012).Accordingly, this study purposely employed explanatory research design with a combination of secondary 
source of data collection, ex post control over variables since the researcher used past data, short and unbalanced 
panel with cross sectional and time dimension, and quantitative approach. 
Population of this study consist of all commercial banks in Ethiopia which are 19 in number. Banks which 
have not annual financial statement for five years from 2011 to 2015 were excluded from the study to determine 
sample size of the study. For that reason, 14 commercial banks were selected. These are: Dashen Bank, commercial 
bank of Ethiopia, Awash International Bank, United Bank, Wegagen Bank, NIB International Bank, Lion 
International Bank, Cooperative Bank of Oromia, Bank of Abyssinia, construction and business bank, Bunna 
International Bank, Zemen Bank, Oromia International Bank, and Abay Bank. Additionally, this study used 
financial and non-financial secondary data obtained from national bank of Ethiopia and audited annual report of 
each bank under investigation. The required data was collected by reviewing these documents. 
 
3.2. Variable Measurement and  Hypotheses  Development  
3.2.1. Measurement of Dependent Variable: Intellectual Capital Performance 
Value added intellectual capital coefficient developed by Pulic (1998) was used to measure intellectual capital 
performance. Accordingly, it can be determined using the following five procedures. 
1. Calculation of value added for all stakeholders using the following equation : 
Value Added = Employee salaries and benefits +Total interest expenses + Taxes +Net income 
2. Determination of value added relational capital coefficient  
                                 Value added relational capital coefficient = Value Added   
                                                                                                      Relational capital   
Where, value added relational capital coefficient signifies the value created by one unit of relational capital and 
relational capital is equal to net asset of banks at the end of t period as of  Lipunga ( 2015). 
3. Determining  value added human capital coefficient  
 
                                 Value added human capital coefficient = Value Added   
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                                                                                                  Human Capital 
Where, value added human capital coefficient shows the contribution made by each dollar invested in human 
capital, reflecting the collective ability of the company to produce best solutions based on the knowledge of people 
in the company. And human capital refers to total salaries, wages and all incentives for the bank during the period 
of t. 
4. Calculation of value added structural capital coefficient  
                         Value added structural capital coefficient = Structural Capital  
                                                                                                               Value Added 
Where, value added structural capital coefficient determines the amount needed to produce a dollar of value 
added and an indication of how the structural capital of success in creating value. Structural capital is simply the 
difference between value added and human capital. 
5.  Calculation of value added intellectual capital coefficient  
 Value added intellectual capital coefficient is therefore the sum of value added human capital coefficient, 
structural capital coefficient and relational capital coefficient. Hence, it can be expressed mathematically as: 
VAIC = VARC + VAHC + STVA  
Where, VAIC= Value added intellectual capital coefficient, indicates corporate value creation 
VARC= Value added relational capital coefficient, indicates the value created by one unit of relational capital 
VAHC= Value added human capital coefficient, indicates contribution of each dollar invested in human capital 
STVA= Value added structural capital coefficient, indicates value created by one unit of structural capital 
3.2.2. Measurement of Independent  and control Variables  
Independent variables of this study are corporate governance attributes including: Board size, gender diversity of 
board of directors, and remuneration of board of directors. Besides, profitability and bank size are used as control 
variables. Measurements of these variables are discussed here. Board size represents total number of directors on 
the board. While, board remuneration is represented by total amount of payments made to directors. Moreover, 
gender diversity is measured by proportion of female members of the board of directors. In the literature, return 
on asset and return on equity can be used to measure profitability of banks. However, return on asset is a better 
proxy for bank profitability opposed to return on equity because return on equity disregards financial leverage. 
Hence, return on asset is used as a proxy measurement of commercial banks profitability. In addition, bank size is 
measure by logarithm of total assets. 
Table 3.1: Summary of Symbol and Measurement of Variables 
No.  Variable  Symbol  Measurement  
1.  Value added intellectual 
capital coefficient 
VAIC Sum of value added relational capital, human capital, 
and structural capital coefficients 
2.  Board Size BOARD Total number of directors on the board 
3.  Gender diversity  GENDER Number of female directors  
 Total number of board 
4.  Board Remuneration   REMUN Total amount of money  directors rewarded 
5.  Bank Profitability ROA  Ratio of net income to total asset 
6.   Bank size  ASSET  Logarithm of total assets 
3.2.3. Hypotheses Development  
The study tested the following research hypotheses developed based on prior related empirical studies.  
      H1: Board size has positive effect on intellectual capital performance 
      H2: Board remuneration and intellectual capital performance are positively associated  
      H3:  There is positive relationship between presence of female directors and intellectual capital performance 
 
3.3. Econometric Model estimation and Specification  
This study employed panel data in which 14 Ethiopian commercial banks were observed over 5 years starting from 
2011-2015. Hence, comparison among pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect regression models were carried 
out to choose the best fitted model. Accordingly, Chow-test, Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test and 
Hausman-test were used to make a choice between pooled OLS and fixed effect, pooled OLS and random effects, 
fixed effects and random effects respectively. Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for random effects was 
carried out to test the presence of random effects. And the result was in favour of rejecting the null hypothesis as 
the test was statistically significant (Insert Table 3.2. Here), suggesting the presence of random effects. The result 
of chow test (F-test) also rejected pooled OLS (Insert Table 3.3 Here). As long as pooled OLS was rejected in 
both cases, favouring random and fixed effect, Hausman test was used to make a choice between random and fixed 
effect. Accordingly, Hausman test validates random effects regression over fixed effect (Insert Table 3.4 Here). 
Therefore, the appropriate model used to make statistical inferences was random effects regression model. 
VAICit = α +β1BOARDit + β2GENDERit + β3REMUNit + β4ROAit + β5ASSETit + (µi + €it ) 
       Where:  VAIC = value added intellectual capital coefficient       BOARD= Total number of directors 
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       GENDER= proportion of female directors                  REMUN=Board remuneration 
      ROA= profitability of bank                                            ASSET= size of bank      
    α = constant; β1-5 = parameters estimated                                   €it = an idiosyncratic error term 
                  µi =Unobserved random effect that varies across banks but not over time        
                  it = bank i during year t 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1. Descriptive Analysis 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the study. The table presents mean, and standard 
deviation as well as minimum and maximum values of regression variables included in the estimated model. 
                                     Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std.Dev Min  Max  
VAIC 6.146883 1.690537 2.653447 12.59244 
BOARD 9.538462 1.846254 5 12 
REMUN 427671.7 201271.8 170000 850000 
GENDER .1277496 .0883756 0   .25 
ROA .029984 .0112167    .0058218 .0637194 
ASSET 9.417356 1.80888 2.659916 11.38527 
                           Source: STATA out put 
The mean intellectual capital performance for the sample banks throughout the study period is 6.146883 
with the standard deviation of 1.690537, minimum and maximum value added intellectual capital coefficient of 
2.653447 and 12.59244 respectively.  The average return on asset as measurement of profitability of Ethiopian 
banks selected in the sample of this study is .029984, the lowest return on asset is .0058218 and the highest return 
on asset is .0637194 with standard deviation of 0.0112167.  Ratio of number of female directors to total number 
of board shows that the average ratio of female directors of these commercial banks under investigation is 
0.1277496 with standard deviation of 0.0883756, minimum and maximum proportions of 0 and 0.25 respectively. 
Corporate governance directive NO SBB/62/2015 article 5(2) also requires a board to be mixture of gender and 
other core competencies. However, nothing is said about number of female directors on board. 
The average board size, measured by number of directors on the board, is approximately 10 with 
minimum of 5 and maximum of 12 members.In accordance with Banking Business Proclamation NO.592/2008, 
National Bank of Ethiopia issued bank corporate governance directives NO SBB/62/2015.  As stated in Art 5(1) 
of this directive the minimum size of board should be nine. However, maximum number of board of directors is 
not determined in this directive though Commercial Code under Art.347 (2) requires for incorporated bodies to 
have a minimum of 3 and maximum of 12 board members. For that reason, empirical evidence of this study 
revealed that the minimum number of boards is below the legal requirement of the directive although the maximum 
number is within the requirement of commercial code. 
The mean with regard to board remuneration is birr 427,671.7 with deviation of birr 201,271.8 ranging 
between birr 170,000 and birr 850,000. As article 4(1 and 2) of directive NO SBB/49/2011 issued in accordance 
with Banking Business Proclamation No 592/2008, annual board compensation to a director shall not exceed birr 
50,000; and monthly allowance shall not exceed birr 2,000. Hence, the upper limit of remuneration per year is birr 
74,000 since remuneration is sum of compensation and allowances. In fact, the remuneration is within the 
requirement on average based on findings of this study. For the variable bank size, a deviation from the mean of 
9.417356 is about 1.80888 with a range between 2.659916 and 11.38527. 
 
4.2. Diagnostic Tests for Classical Linear Regression Model Assumptions 
Normality assumption is required in order to conduct single or joint hypothesis tests about the model parameters 
(Brooks, 2014). As stated in Gujarati (2003), Normality of the residual shows that the estimator is unbiased, 
minimum variance and consistent. Shapiro wilk test was used to test normality distribution of error term. Result 
of this test proved that the residuals are normally distributed (Insert Table 4.2 Here). VIF was also used to test 
multicollinearity. Hence, VIF for each explanatory variable is less than 2, suggesting there is no severe 
multicollinearity problem in the estimated model (Insert Table 4.3 Here). Ramsey RESET test was performed 
for model specification with null hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables and its result was statistically 
insignificant supporting the null hypothesis (Insert Table 4.4 Here). In addition, Wooldridge test was used to test 
autocorrelation with null hypothesis that there is no first order auto correlation. And there was statistically 
insignificant result supporting absence of autocorrelation (Insert Table 4.5 Here). Other assumption required in 
the classical linear regression model is that the average value of the errors is zero. In fact, if a constant term is 
included in the regression equation, this assumption will never be violated (Brooks, 2014). Hence, a constant term 
is included in the model of this study to satisfy this assumption of classical linear regression model, making the 
value of the errors to be zero. Moreover, heteroscedasticity was controlled using White’s robust standard error.   
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4.3. Regression Analysis 
Table 4.6: Random-effects GLS regression results  
VAIC Coef. Robust Std. Err. Z P>|Z| 
CONS 4.753465 1.224004 3.88 0.000 
BOARD -.2929724 .1146068 -2.56 0.011 
REMUN 8.29e-07 8.10e-07 1.02 0.306   
GENDER .5139212 .193336 2.66 0.008 
ROA 63.27007    30.20035 2.10 0.036 
ASSET  .1460075 .1086601 1.34   0.179 
Number of observations  =  63 
Prob > chi2   =    0.0000  
R-squared = 0.5446 
           Source: STATA out put 
The results of random effects GLS regression model on the effect of corporate governance attributes on 
intellectual capital performance of commercial banks in Ethiopia is shown in Table 4.2. The estimated regression 
model is statistically significant with 54.46 % explanatory power of independent variables and Prob > chi2   = 
0.0000.  Board size has statistically significant and negative effect on value added intellectual capital coefficient 
at 95% confidence level which is contrary to the expected hypothesis. This is concurrent with (Al-Musalli & Ismail, 
2012; Alizadeh, Chashmi, & Bahnamiri, 2014). The smaller the number of board of directors, the higher value 
creation whereas the higher the board size, the lower value added intellectual capital coefficient. This could be due 
to communication and coordination problems of boards while making decision and other strategic directions to 
meet objectives of banks though board of directors have superior contribution in creating, developing and 
managing intellectual capital as of resource dependency theory. 
Gender diversity represented by presence of female directors on the board has positive and statistically 
significant effect on intellectual capital performance of commercial banks in Ethiopia at 5% significant level, 
supporting the expected hypothesis. This empirical result is consistent with findings of research studies carried out 
by (Swartz & Firer, 2009; Oba, Ibikunle, & Damagum, 2013). As the presence of female directors on the board 
increases, intellectual capital performance of banks under investigation will improve. This finding suggests that 
presence of higher percentage of women with board of directors will make value creation better off. Because, 
female directors have ability to attract and communicate with a wider scope of employees and other stake holders 
to increase the competitive abilities and make  decisions on the future intellectual capital performance with more 
sensitivity toward community concerns. Women directors also have more detailed thoughts in the decision-making 
analysis (Rasmini, Wirakusuma, & Yuniasih, 2014).  
Likewise, profitability of banks has statistically significant and positive effect on value added intellectual 
capital coefficient at 5% significance level. Here, the implication is that as  return on asset of commercial banks 
as a proxy measure of profitability increases, value added intellectual capital coefficient will also be improved 
similarly and vice versa(El-Banny, 2008;Meressa,2016). This is due to the fact that the more time managers use 
to identify causes of losses if happened, the less time they can spend to undertake other useful intellectual activities 
and vice versa (Soheili & pakdel, 2012). That’s why good financial performance motivates bank directors to do 
various value creative activities (El-Banny, 2008). Hence, positive financial out come in commercial banks 
contributes to greater time devotion by managers in intellectual activities like motivating and training  employees , 
conducting research and development activities, convince shareholders about their superior managerial abilities to 
obtain higher degrees of confidence from investors and other stakeholders. These activities could also improve 
value added intellectual capital coefficient. However, the variables board remuneration and bank size have 
statistically insignificant effect on intellectual capital performance even at 90% confidence level.  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
Corporate governance has been considered as a cause for the failure of many corporate entities throughout the 
World. As a result, the issue has become a focus for research among academicians and researchers due to its 
greatest reputation (Yemane & Raju, 2015). On the other hand intellectual capital performance has become an 
important factor in outshining competitiveness of individuals, companies and nations in the recent knowledge base 
economy. Hence, the performance of intellectual capital investments is important because it affects long term 
competitive advantage (Saleh, Rahman, & Hassan, 2009). However, only few studies are carried out regarding the 
connection between these two issues. Accordingly, objective of this paper was to empirically investigate the effect 
of corporate governance attributes on intellectual capital performance of commercial banks in Ethiopia using five 
years financial and non-financial data. Results of the random effects GLS regression revealed that gender diversity 
and profitability have statistically significant positive effect on intellectual capital performance indicating that 
higher return on asset and presence of female directors increase value creation. On the contrary, board size has 
statistically significant negative effect on intellectual capital performance implying that the more board of directors, 
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the lower the value added intellectual capital coefficient and vice versa. However, board remuneration and bank 
size have statistically insignificant effect on value added intellectual capital coefficient.  
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Table 3.2: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for the presence of random effects 
        Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
        Vaic [bank,t] = Xb + u[bank] + e [bank,t] 
Estimated results: Var sd = sqrt (Var) 
Vaic   2.925909        1.710529 
e 1.197868        1.094471 
u .7530975        .8678119 
Test:   Var (u) = 0 
                   chibar2 (01) =     6.26 
                   Prob > chibar2 =   0.0062 
 
Table 3.3: F-test of simple Pooled OLS against fixed-effects specification 
F test that all u_i=0:     F (13, 44) =     2.99              Prob > F = 0.0033 
 
Table 3.4: Hausman Specification Test of Random-Effects against Fixed-Effects 
 ---- Coefficients ----  
(b) 
fixed     
(B) 
random 
(b-B)       
 Difference    
sqrt (diag(V_b-V_B)) 
S.E. 
BOARD -.2291719        -.2929724        .0638006         .136876 
REMUN 1.16E-06           8.29E-07        3.27E-07        9.31E-07 
GENDER .404672             .5139212       -.1092492        .1357934 
ROA 64.70049           63.27007        1.430429        13.58574 
ASSET -.6661986         .1460075       -.8122061        .5992437 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                  chi2 (4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                                =        3.48 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.4805 
 
Table 4.2: Normality Test 
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
Variable Obs W      V z    Prob>z 
   Residuals     63      0.99075       0.523      -1.401      0.91941 
 
Table 4.3: Multicollinearity Test 
VARIABLE VIF 1/VIF 
ROA 1.72            0.581563 
REMUN 1.71          0.584117 
ASSET 1.13           0.884462 
GENDER     1.13           0.884927 
BOARD 1.13           0.888507 
    MEAN VIF          1.36 
 
Table 4.4: Model Specification Test for Omission of Variables 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of VAIC 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 54) =      2.63 
Prob > F =      0.0596 
 
Table 4.5:  Test of autocorrelation 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F (1, 12) = 0.368 
Prob > F = 0.5556 
